The air force can't destroy Iran's nuclear capability

            Most experts interpreted former Mossad chief Meir Dagan's warnings against an Israeli attack on Iran as being aimed first and foremost at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak. But there are those who see things a bit differently. One is the former commander of the Israel Navy, Read Admiral (ret. ) Avraham Botzer. In his view, if Netanyahu and Barak intend to attack in Iran (something this writer doubts ), and if they have a prepared plan for such an attack, it must surely be backed by the air force. "I'm afraid the air force has convinced the politicians that an attack on Iran is possible and will achieve results," Botzer said in an interview to Haaretz. "If I'm right, then we're dealing with a dangerous illusion." Botzer was head of the navy from 1968-1972; he also served on the Israel Defense Forces General Staff. Since retiring, he has held management positions and been active on the Council for Peace and Security, founded by the late Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv. "Generals have a tendency to fight the last wars, and that is exactly what happened to the air force," Botzer said. "In the [1967] Six-Day War, the air force destroyed the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air forces within a couple of hours, gaining absolute control over and supremacy in the air, which allowed the ground forces to advance. Exhilarated by their successes, the air force's commanders believed it would succeed in exactly the same way in the next war, too, and they convinced the General Staff and the politicians of it. But this was an illusion. "In the [1973] Yom Kippur War, we were sure the air force would destroy any Egyptian force that crossed the Suez Canal. Thus we were oblivious and did not make the necessary preparations for war on land. The result, as Ezer Weizman [a former air force commander] admitted, was that 'the missile beat the airplane.'" Botzer noted that the air force and, indeed, the entire IDF knew as far back as 1970 that the Egyptians had moved surface-to-air missiles into the area of the Suez Canal, and that preparations must be made for a different kind of warfare in the future. Nevertheless, Israel continued to ignore the missile threat. "The air force regained aerial supremacy in the Suez Canal area only after the Armored Corps had conquered the last of the missile bases in that theater and removed the threat," he recalled. "And this was done without airborne assistance." Botzer's attack on the air force comes in response to an essay published by Maj. Gen. (res. ) David Ivry, a former air force commander, in the journal "Israel Defense" (edited by journalist Amir Rapaport ). In his essay, Ivry urged Israel to strengthen the air force in order to ensure air supremacy in every possible theater - in the air, on land and at sea. "Twice in the history of Israel's wars, they managed to delude us into thinking that if we just maintained a large aerial force, victory in battle would be assured," Botzer retorted. "The first time was in the Yom Kippur War, and the second was in the war in Lebanon in 2006, when we pinned our faith on the air force destroying Hezbollah, which is why we did not call up the reserves and did not introduce ground forces in time. The result: Residents of the Galilee only emerged from their shelters after a shameful agreement was reached through mediators. Why shameful? Because Hezbollah has consequently increased its power." Botzer is loyal to the military service in which he spent his career, the navy, but his fidelity does not blind him: He recognizes the navy's limitations and weaknesses. Yet he sees no contradiction between recognition of these weaknesses and his support for submarines. Despite the navy's limitations, Botzer is a great believer in the need to strengthen it and make it into Israel's strategic arm. This has been his position for the past two decades, together with other enthusiastic backers of acquiring additional submarines. Today, Israel has three submarines, and two additional ones are under construction in German shipyards. According to foreign reports, the submarines are equipped to carry and launch eight missiles, which can also be armed with nuclear warheads. Botzer believes Israel should have a fleet of eight or nine submarines. His estimation that the air force lacks any real ability to attack Iran in a way that would destroy its nuclear capability for many years merely reinforces this position. Lacking the option of attack, he said, Israel must rely on its "strategic deterrence." This phrase, when spoken by an Israeli, and especially by a military man, is understood by the foreign press as code words for Israel's nuclear capability, given the global assumption that Israel has an arsenal of hundreds of nuclear bombs. "America's deterrence during the Cold War, and today as well, is based on submarines," he noted. In any strategic nuclear doctrine, submarines play an important role in creating second-strike capability. Second-strike capability means that even if the enemy destroys your entire arsenal of nuclear weapons, you will still have the ability to strike back and destroy him. This can only be achieved by submarines, which are difficult to detect. (07,43)